Balancing Ease of Doing Business and Corporate Accountability: A Critical Study of Administrative Control Under the Reformed Company Law Regime in India

Abstract

India’s company-law reforms are increasingly pursuing two goals that are often presented as competing: reducing the cost of legitimate enterprise and strengthening corporate accountability. The article examines whether the post-2013 framework has struck a principled balance between these objectives. It examines the Companies Act, 2013, the Companies (Amendment) Acts of 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2020, the in-house adjudication mechanism, the institutional roles of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), Registrar of Companies (RoC), Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA), National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 thru doctrinal and policy analysis. The article argues that decriminalization of technical defaults, digitization, differentiated regulation and faster restructuring can improve compliance without compromising accountability, but only where reform is risk based, procedurally fair, transparent and underpinned by credible enforcement. The current architecture is fragmented: routine defaults may trigger automated penalties while complex misconduct faces investigatory and adjudicatory delay; overlapping mandates lead to uncertainty; and formal board independence does not always neutralize controlling-shareholder agency costs. The article suggests a “accountability-preserving simplification” model based on graded liability, consolidated digital compliance, published enforcement criteria, coordinated supervision, stronger gatekeeper oversight and measurable regulatory outcomes. Thus properly understood, ease of doing business is not deregulation but the reduction of avoidable friction, combined with a higher probability of proportionate sanction for serious misconduct.